Sorry if it wasn't clearly shown before - I posted this as a comment to the original post on Saturday instead of a new post. I'm still figuring out how to use the blog.
After reading Chapter 3 in Rubin, I was particularly interested in the section on Budget Process and Power and how state governments are affected. I have to admit that I did not know off the top of my head which veto option Governor Rendell has at his disposal, but after a quick Google search I learned that he has the right to veto legislative bills as well as the power to line-item veto specific provisions of a bill. The argument behind this type of veto power in the book is that it provides a system of checks and balances between the executive and legislative branches, in this case of state government. Therefore, whenever members of the legislature are using the state budget to pursue self-seeking or partisan objectives, the governor will step in and “seek the public policy goal of balanced and efficient budgets, with the minimum of waste.”
I suppose my question for the group is whether or not we agree with the assertion that governors who are elected to act in the best interest of the entire state population are able to be non-partisan in their use of vetoes or line-item vetoes to remove unnecessary appropriations from proposed legislation. We can even go further with the topic and discuss Governor Rendell’s use of the line-item veto in Pennsylvania or we can keep the topic more general.
Personally, I have to agree with the authors, Glenn Abney and Thomas Lauth, referenced on pg. 85 in Rubin, who determined that governors are more likely to use veto power, specifically line-item vetoes when they face a majority of party opposites in their state legislature. Therefore, it seems obvious that partisan politics have a larger impact on the practice of vetoing appropriations than whether or not they are beneficial to the general population. While I am not saying that the only reason governors veto legislation or parts of legislation is to squash an opposing party’s agenda, I do think the use of such vetoes deserves a closer examination of the politics behind the decision.
I think that they general idea of the line item vetoe is a tempting one. It seems like this would be a good way to cut waste. It also seems like it may balance the scales if the majority in the legislature and the executive are different parties. The line item veto does offer a lot of legislative power to the executive. The legislature holds hearings and has teh advice of expert committees. the legislature also makes deals and adds riders to help legislation pass. The line item veto seems to throw all of that out the window and could completely change the politics of budgeting. Or, in cases like PA where the Governor has that power, he is essentially a supreme legislator, it really blurs the lines between the separation of the branches.
ReplyDeleteHi Randy and Meghan,
ReplyDeleteI guess we need to add someone to your blog here.
Good discussion. Line-item vetos are quite a topic and most of the discussion centers on separation of powers. The main issue is that line-item vetos are essetial a legislative function and, therefore, to give that to the executive is a breach of the separation of powers. That is, in using the line-item veto governors are essential writing legislation (by deleting and changing laws). Governors are not supposed to be non-partisan, they are political by nature. They represent their constituency that elected them (which sometimes requires them to think of the"good of the state."). In any case, line-item budgeting certainly changes the balance of thing -- some think for the better and some for the worse. One main advantage is that Governors can get past side deals made for individual legislators -- he/she can line-veto them out and the individual legislator has no power to override the veto. (example, the legislator who will only vote for the bill/budget if he/she gets money for a district project. So they give it, they pass it, then the governor can line it out.